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Abstract
The present paper suggests a possible framework to analyze the impact of changes to the economic
and social environment on the topology of networks formed. Economic (costs) and social (norms) con-
straints bind individuals in their ability to create ties with others. When global phenomena a¤ect these
constraints, the overall shapes of resulting networks naturally alter. I attempt to shed light on this
relationship.
1 Introduction
The importance of social structure in determining economic outcomes is widely documented.
Word of mouth communication plays an important role in disseminating information about
products, prices, and quality (Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955)), network e¤ects pervade the
adoption and spread of new technologies (Conley and Udry (2001)), and individuals often
rely on friends or acquaintances to obtain information on job opportunities (Granovetter
(1973)) to name only a few examples.
The present paper aims to evaluate the way in which changes to the economic and social
environment naturally translate into changes in the networks of interactions formed. The
latest wave of globalization, for example, is redening the face of communication on a world
scale. Not only are people able to make long distance phone calls at very little cost, but the
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widespread learning of the English language across countries and cultures mean that it is now
possible for many to maintain relationships, private or professional, with others on the other
side of the globe. The impact of education on racism and tolerance is another important
example. Psychologists hold that fear resulting from mis-information (or lack of) is one of the
most important factor explaining discriminatory behaviour vis-à-vis other identity groups1.
As a response, public funding of awareness schemes have developed on a large scale in an
attempt to ease tensions between communities and promote the normalization of dialogue
across them. In both cases, it is natural and compelling to enquire about the transformations
implied at the global level.
To this end, we take a broad geographicapproach by assuming that nodes are located
in some underlying s-dimensional Euclidian space and derive positive utility solely from
forming ties with others su¢ ciently close to them within the metric. The usefulness of this
approach stems from the fact that distances may be customized to account for economic
constraints. For example, a rise in the costs of maintaining links may be modeled as an
e¤ective ination of distances. As distances are inated, the number of nodes lying within
the radius of positive utility of any given node falls. Each node therefore nds it increasingly
di¢ cult to form links.
To model the network formation per se, we borrow from the recent work of Vazquez
(2003) and Jackson and Rogers (2007). Nodes are introduced into the network sequentially
and meetings proceed from a combination of random and network-based devices. Each new
node entering the network is rst introduced to a subset of nodes picked at random from
the existing set. She then goes on to meet some of the neighbours of those randomly chosen
nodes. The Jackson-Rogers-Vazquez (henceforth JRV) framework is both simple and intu-
itive, however its greatest credentials lie in its ability to generate networks which reproduce
accurately their empirical counterparts2. In view of our objective, the JRV framework is
therefore a natural one to base our analysis upon.
Our main results relate the topology of the networks formed and the underlying economic
constraints. First, I show how the constraints a¤ect the distribution of links arising. Second,
and contrastingly, I show that clustering is essentially determined by the dimension s of the
1"Le Racisme", Que sais-je n 1603.
2See, e.g., Vega-Redondo (2007). In short, a large number of empirical networks tend to exhibit the following regularities:
(i) short average distance, (ii) degree distribution exhibiting a power law in the tail, (iii) high clustering, (iv) assortativity, and
(v) negative clustering-degree relationship.
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underlying space. We are thus able to make sharp predictions regarding some important
aspects of network topology following changes to the underlying economic environment.
Next I show that in a geographic context and when nodes are searching potential partners
locally in the network, the intensity of the constraints is unimportant in the sense that having
more stringent constraints does not reduce the prospects of nding matching nodes. This
adds importantly to previously recorded motivations for using local search in models of
network formation, particularly in hostile environments for which constraints are tight.
Lastly, recent empirical evidence (Goyal, Moraga, and van der Leij (2007)) seems to
indicate that, at least for some networks evolving over time, the number of links formed
using the network tends to grow faster than links formed at random when the overall density
of the network rises. I show how this phenomenon can be accounted for in a simple way
within the model presented in this paper. Essentially, when constraints are relaxed nodes
access to the network is enhanced.
The present paper is related to the economics literature on network formation, introduced
by the work of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and Bala and Goyal (2000)3. Models using the
idea of an underlying metric have been developed by Gilles and Johnson (2000), and Galeotti,
Goyal, and Kamphorst (2006). The focus of these papers however is largely distinct from
ours since they are concerned with the formation of small networks for which standard
game-theoretic assumptions may reasonably be expected to hold. This paper, on the other
hand, incorporates a large amount of bounded rationality on the part of agents involved in
the process of network formation. In the spirit of Vega-Redondo (2007) we assume that in
such a complex environment nodes follow a number of simple rules.
This paper is also related to the work of Strogatz and Watts (1998) in which nodes
populating a ring lattice connect their closest neighbours. The issues these authors address
are however wholly distinct from ours since they focus on the sharp impact that introducing
some long range links may have on average distances in the network. The literature on
random geometric graphs nally (Penrose (2003)), shares some common features with the
present paper. In the former, nodes are placed randomly in Euclidian space and edges added
to connect points that are close to each other. The absence of time, and of any kind of local
search, mark however some important di¤erences with our work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and gives some
3See Goyal (2007) for an overview of this literature.
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preliminary results. The topological analysis is carried out in Section 3. Section 4 applies
some of our results to the data analyzed by Goyal, Moraga, and van der Leij (2007) as an
illustrative example of their empirical applicability. Section 5.1 discusses geodesic distances
in the model. Section 5.2 discusses the model vis-à-vis its non-geographic counterpart.
Important extensions, including higher dimensions, are discussed in Section 5.3. Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
Consider a countably innite set of nodes labelled according to N. For i 2 N, Xi4 denes a
random variable locating node i in some s-dimensional Euclidian space S. Furthermore, we
assume that (Xi)i2N are uniformly and independently distributed in S. Nodes derive utility
ui(g; (xi)i2N) from forming ties with others according to network g. Let ", xed for society
as a whole, determine the neighbourhood 
i(xi) in S within which agent i derives positive
marginal utility from being linked with others. That is, we assume
@ui
@n
i
> 0 (1)
@ui
@n
ci
< 0
where n
i = #fjji and j linked; xj 2 
i(xi)g, and n
ci = #fjji and j linked; xj 2 
ci (xi)g. Unless
stated otherwise we assume for simplicity that S is identied with the torus of unit length,
and that 
(x) is given by the interval of length " centred at x. Higher dimensional S are
discussed in Section 5.3.1. Notice that xj 2 
i(xi) if and only if xi 2 
j(xj). We shall say that
i and j match whenever the previous conditions hold. Also, since nodes are symmetric under
our assumptions we may write 
(xi) instead of 
i(xi). Finally, we require " << 1.
Nodes enter the world sequentially, one at a time, so that node t also enters the world at
time t. Upon entrance, each new node randomly meets mr existing nodes chosen uniformly
at random from the current set of nodes f1; :::; t 1g. Nodes also meet some of the neighbours
of their random meetings by following each of their (outgoing) links independently and
with probability . We emphasize here the distinction between neighbourhoods in S and
4Upper case symbols are used to indicate random variables, while corresponding lower case symbols indicate realizations of
the random variables.
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neighbourhood of a node i in network g. The rst concept is topological, while the second
refers to the subset of nodes which are linked to i. It follows from (1) that whenever node
i meets another node j such that xj 2 
(xi) a directed link is formed from i to j, which
we denote by ij. Throughout, we refer to the links initiated (received) by node i as the
outgoing (incoming) links of i. Note nally the clear distinction made between the meeting
and matchingprocesses which jointly constitute the formation process. On the one hand
the meeting process determines which pairs of agents are introduced to one another. The
matching process on the other hand determines which of the former pairs give rise to a link
being formed.
Since two nodes can only form a link if they nd themselves within distance " in S, prox-
imity in the network also conveys valuable information regarding nodesrelative positions in
S. In particular, nodes are much more likely to form links in the neighbourhood of those that
they matched with rather than those with whom they did not. Our rst result makes this
statement precise. Proposition 1.(ii) gives the probability that a node matches with some
other nodes neighbour, given that she has matched with the former. Proposition 1.(iii) gives
the same probability given that she has not matched with the parent node5. Proposition
1.(i) simply states the obvious probability that a node matches with some random other. All
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 1 Let i, j , and k 2 @. Matching probabilities are given by
(i) Pr(Xj 2 
i) = "
(ii) Pr(Xk 2 
i j (Xj 2 
i) ^ (Xk 2 
j)) = 3=4
(iii) Pr(Xk 2 
i j (Xj 2 
ci ) ^ (Xk 2 
j)) =
"
4 (1  ")
Note that Proposition 1 shows how the geographic model analyzed here provides addi-
tional motivation for using local search in models of network formation. By Proposition
1.(ii), the probability of matching with a neighbours neighbour is independent of " in the
model. In hostile environments, as " tends to zero, this means that friends of my friends
provide a particularly favourable pool of individuals with whom to form new links6.
5Parent node in this context is used to indicate that node which outgoing link was used to generate the network-based
meeting under consideration.
6Consider the connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in which the benet to node i from being connected to
node j is given by d(i;j;g), where d(i; j; g) indicates geodesic distance between nodes i and j in network g. With these payo¤s
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Next, the number of nodes met during the random stage is xed and equal to mr. However,
since the number of nodes met through the network is unbound, conditions should be imposed
that guarantee convergence of our process for t large. Following the literature on stochastic
network formation we henceforth make extensive use of mean-eld approximations on the
premise that doing so greatly simplies the analysis7. Our next result states the conditions
under which the average number of links formed by entering nodes approaches a steady state
as t!1.
Proposition 2 Let mt denote the number of (outgoing) links formed by node t. In the mean-
eld approximation, E[mt] approaches a steady state as t!1 provided mr" < 1.
In what follows we assume that the condition mr" < 1 is always satised, and let m
denote the steady state average number of outgoing links. Upon entering the network each
new node forms an average mr" links with random nodes. By Proposition 1.(ii), she also
forms an average 34mr"m links in the neighbourhoods of these nodes, along with a further
"
4(1 ") mr (1  ")m links in the neighbourhoods of the nodes she met randomly but failed to
form a link with. Notice that the ratio of the average number of links formed respectively
in the neighbourhoods of matching and non-matching parent nodes is 3 : 1. Finally, adding
contributions from the random and network-based processes gives
m = mr"(1 +
3
4
m) +mr (1  ")

m
"
4 (1  ")

= mr"(1 + m)
from which
m =
mr"
1  mr" (2)
Naturally, increases in any of mr; "; or  raises the expected number of outgoing links as
indicated by (2). Notice also that m!1 as mr"! 1.
A natural partition of links in our model results from the distinction made between
random and network-based links. Following Jackson and Rogers (2007) we may dene the
ratio r of, respectively, the average number of random and network-based links in the network
in our model, the expected benet from meeting a neighbours neighbour is given by 4
3
(1  ), while for t large the expected
benet from meeting a random node is ". For equal meeting costs, local search may therefore be optimal even in situations of
weak informational decay (provided  < 1   4
3
") for which the perfect monitoring model warrants link formation with distant
nodes instead.
7For an account of the performance of mean-eld approximation in statistical models of network formation the reader is
referred to Vega-Redondo (2007).
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formation process
r =
average number of random links
average number of network   based links (3)
In particular, the r statistic provides a useful measure of randomness in this kind of models.
Using our previous results we obtain
r =
mr"
mr"
 
3
4m

+mr (1  ")
h
m "4(1 ")
i = 1
m
i.e.
rm =
1

(4)
Equation (4) is a distinguishing feature of the present model. It indicates that denser
networks also tend to be less random. As later emphasized in Section 4, this result proves
important in view of empirical applications. Combining (2) and (4) we have r = 1 mr"mr" ,
which shows that increases in any of mr; "; or  reduces r. Intuitively, raising " improves
nodesaccess to the network. It should therefore not be too surprising that raising " also
reduces the relative importance of randomness in the model.
The following proposition summarizes the above observations
Proposition 3 A change in any one parameter keeping other parameters xed induces opposite
shifts on m and r respectively. In particular, a rise in any one of mr; "; or  leads to greater
network density and falling randomness.
3 Topological Analysis
3.1 Degree Distribution
The sequential addition of nodes in the JRV framework naturally introduces heterogeneity
among nodes in the network. Whereas all nodes have identical expected out-degree in the
formation process, older nodes accumulate incoming links for a longer period of time and
are therefore more likely to exhibit high in-degrees. In what follows we analyze the in-degree
distribution of nodes resulting from our formation process.
Let di(t) denote the in-degree of node i at time t. The probability of node i receiving a
new link at time t is obtained by adding the probability of receiving a link through random
selection with the probability of receiving a link through network-based meeting. The rst
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term is (approximately) (mrt )", the probability of her being randomly selected times the
matching probability of two random nodes. In the same vein the second term is mrm"(di(t)mt ),
each node receiving a share of the total expected mrm" network-based links formed in
proportion to her own in-degree. The total probability of node i receiving a new link at time
t is therefore given by
mr"
t
+ (
mr"
t
)di(t) (5)
Using (2) and (4), we may rewrite (5) as
1
t

r
1 + r
m+
1
1 + r
di

(6)
highlighting the respective shares of randomness and network-based linking in the process.
In the mean-eld approach di(t) is a probabilistic stockvariable, the evolution of which
is described in continuous time by the probabilistic owgiven by (5). The random system
is thereby transformed yielding a set of deterministic ordinary di¤erential equations of the
form
ddi(t)
dt
=
mr"
t
+ (
mr"
t
)di(t) (7)
Notice the proportionality in degree-growth in (7). Lastly, initial conditions for all i solve
for di(t), 8 i; t. The degree distribution follows immediately. Details of the proof are relegated
to the appendix.
Theorem 1 As t ! 1, in the mean-eld approximation, the cdf of the in-degree distribution
tends to
F (d) = 1  ( 
 1
 1 + d
)1=mr" (8)
Notice that for d large the in-degree distributions resulting from our formation process
approximate power laws. As shown by Albert and Barabasi (1999), power-law degree distri-
butions follow from proportionality in degree-growth. In our model, as in the standard JRV
framework, proportionality in degree growth results from network-based linking. Lastly, no-
tice that for   0 the network formation process approaches one of uniform random linking8.
In that case it is easily shown that an exponential distribution obtains9.
The following corollary provides important comparative statics results regarding the de-
gree distribution obtained in (8)
8 In our model, only by acting on  can network-based links be a¤ected independently of random links.
9See, e.g., Vega-Redondo (2007).
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Corollary 1 Let F and F 0 denote the cumulative distribution functions of the formation
processes with parameters (mr, ", ), and (m0r, "0, 
0) respectively,
(i) If (m0r, "0, 
0) > (mr, ", ), then F 0 strictly rst order stochastically dominates F .
(ii) Given (m0r, "0, 
0), and (mr, ", ) such that m0 > m and r0 = r then F 0 strictly rst order
stochastically dominates F .
(iii) Given (m0r, "0, 
0), and (mr, ", ) such that r0 > r and m0 = m then F 0 strictly second
order stochastically dominates F .
Corollary 1 has important welfare implications. Such a systematic analysis however is
besides the focus of the present paper. The reader is referred to Jackson and Rogers (2007)
for a detailed discussion of these issues.
Before turning to the next section notice that, following Corollary 1, increases in r may
be accompanied by second order stochastic dominance or its opposite. As noted above, fat-
tails result from network-based links. When average degree is kept xed, a rise in r signals a
transfer from the contribution of network-based links to that of random links which therefore
reduces the spread in the distribution of degree. On the other hand when the rise in r mirrors
a fall in m, Corollary 1.(i) indicates a dominance of the mean e¤ect.
3.2 Clustering
There exist a number of possible measures of clustering, each dening a variation on a theme.
In the model we present, one measure naturally imposes itself. For a given network g, it
indicates the fraction of times the dotted connection in Figure (A) of the appendix exists
given the pair of bold links, i.e.
C(g) =
X
i;j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgjkgikX
i;j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgjk
(9)
where gij = 1 if link ij exists in g and gij = 0 otherwise.
More intuitively, C(g) can be expressed in terms of the percentage of times (g) that two
of a nodes neighbours are linked (see Figure (B)),
(g) =
X
i;j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgjkgikX
i;j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgik
=
X
i;j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgjkgikX
i;j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgjk
X
i;j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgjkX
i;j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgik
= C(g)
X
i;j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgjkX
i;j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgik
(10)
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We show in the appendix that for t large clustering may be approximated using the
following expression
C =
E(triplets per node i)
m2
(11)
The average number of triplets per node can be calculated, in the mean-eld approxima-
tion, by separating out the situations according to whether j, and k, were met randomly or
through the network. The following Theorem is proven in the appendix.
Theorem 2 As t!1, in the mean-eld approximation
(i) sup" C = lim"!0 C = 34 .
(ii) @C@" < 0 where continuity holds.
(iii) @C@ 7 0 depending on parameter values.
Interestingly, in a similar model Strogatz and Watts (1998) previously simulated a lowest
upper bound for clustering equal to 34 . In view of Proposition 1.(ii), it is easy to see why such
a result holds. In fact, referring back to (9) one can see that Proposition 1.(ii) delivers an
immediate measure of clustering provided the formation process is such that a node meets all
the neighhbours of those she links to. In the model presented here each new node only meets
her random meetings neighbours so that the former condition is only satised provided
network-based links can safely be ignored, which occurs as " ! 0 since in that case r ! 1.
This explains point (i) in Theorem 2.
As " moves away from zero, network-based links start forming a non-negligible part of
the total number of links existing. Since entering nodes do not meet the neighbours of
the nodes they met through the network10, the number of situations depicted in Figure
(A) where the dotted link never materializes increases importantly too, thereby triggering
downward pressure on overall clustering. While on the one hand this explains point (ii) of
the Theorem, the same argument also gives an important sense in which the determinants
of clustering are largely independent from the intensity of the constraints in the underlying
space S. Indeed, without loss in the meeting process, changes to " do not a¤ect clustering. In
Section 5.3 I show that the key element determining the level of clustering is the dimension
of the underlying space S.
10Naturally, due to neighbourhood overlap in the process they may e¤ectively meet some of them.
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Our last comment concerns the nite discontinuity points observed regarding clustering.
Clustering arises in the JRV framework as a result of local search. A triplet is formed as
soon as a node randomly links another and goes on to form a link with some neighbour of
that node. We term this process rst order clustering. However, when the average number
of links formed in the neighbourhood of matching parent nodes is greater than one, more
triplets are formed due to the fact that two neighbours of a given node have a non-trivial
probability of being linked (so long as some amount of (rst order) clustering already exists).
We refer to this process as second order clusteringsince it arises only when some clustering
already prevails in the network. Clustering therefore exhibits discontinuous jumps whenever
the average number of links formed, respectively, in the neighbourhoods of matching and non-
matching parent nodes reach the critical value 1. Numerical estimates show that the e¤ect
of second order clustering can lead to discontinuous jumps which are large in magnitude.
For  = 1; and mr = 10 we go from less than a third of triplets realized to well over a half at
the threshold.
4 Empirical applications
Our model constitutes a powerful instrument for the empirical investigation of networks.
First, by Theorem 1, mr" can be obtained from the slope of the degree distribution. Second,
using equation (1) along with the observed value of the average degree m gives mr". Third,
 is retrieved by taking the ratio of mr" and mr". Notice that at this point equation (3)
provides an estimate of r. Finally, the biggest di¢ culty lies in separating the e¤ects of mr
and ". Closer investigation of the model reveals that the only place in which the e¤ect of
" is singled-out is in second-order clustering arising in the neighbourhoods of non-matching
parent nodes. This poses two problems. Firstly, it means that for a large range of parameter
values separate estimation of mr and " is precluded. Secondly, inspection of Theorem 2
reveals that the necessary condition for retrieving " from C(g) requires itself knowledge of "
to be evaluated. This means that even in the most favorable range of parameters we can
hope for no more than a simple test of non-inconsistency. The impact of this limitation
depends on the particular question one aims to address and the assumptions one is willing
to make about the formation process. For example, in many situations mr = 1 naturally
suggests itself given the nature of the problem. Following the above procedure then delivers
11
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As an illustrative example, we apply some of our results to the data analyzed by Goyal,
Moraga, and van der Leij (2007) concerning the evolution of coauthorship in the economics
literature through the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. The coauthor network provides a natural
platform for empirical applications of our model. First, the time-sequencing and meeting
process of JRV provide a very intuitive description of their real-world counterpart in the
context of coauthorship. Second, the amount of interaction involved in such relationships
is such that communication costs are likely to play a prominent role in the determination
of matching outcomes. Third, the availability of data dating back to 1970 is particularly
relevant in our context considering the way in which communication costs have evolved
over that period. The question therefore is whether our model is able to shed light on the
evolution of coauthorship over the last decades.
Table 1 below is adapted from Goyal, Moraga, and van der Leij (2007). First, notice
the negative relationship exhibited between randomness and average degree. Second, while
network density trends upward through time,  repeatedly falls from one decade to the next.
Provided nodes attempt to achieve a target number of links, it is easy to see that  and m
should indeed evolve in opposite directions in our model11.
In view of our interpretation, these results therefore suggest that sharp falls in communi-
cation costs over the period under consideration largely contributed in lifting geographical
barriers to coauthorship. While the resulting positive impact on coauthorship likely lead re-
searchers to cooperate with a lesser proportion of their own coauthorscolleagues, increases
in the average number of links indicate a dominance of the rst e¤ect. Falling randomness
is then accounted for in our interpretation by agentsimproved access to the network.
70s 80s 90s
m :445 :622 :836
r 2:94 2:70 2:49
 :76 :59 :48
Table 1
11Suppose agents tailor their behaviour so as to achieve an expected number of (outgoing) links equal to K (possibly due to
resource constraints or other), taking other agents behaviour as given. Letting m denote average degree in the network, the
expected number of links formed as a function of  is given by mr"(1 + 34m
) +mr (1  ")
h
m "
4(1 ")
i
= mr"(1 + m).
Setting mr"(1 + m) = K then yields  = K mr"mr"m , showing that
@
@m < 0.
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(adapted from Goyal, Moraga, and van der Leij (2007))
5 Discussions
5.1 Distances
Recently, a number of studies have provided analytical results in an attempt to shed light
on the small world phenomenon. Inuential work by Newman, Strogatz, and Watts (2001)
has established standard methods to estimate diameters in large, complex networks. In
this approach, the model is given by starting from a degree distribution P and choosing a
graph uniformly at random from all graphs with this distribution of degrees. Within this
framework, starting from a node chosen at random, the number of nodes one link away is
given by the average degree k of P . Each such node in turn has degree distributed according
to P 0(k) = kP (k)
k
. The average number of nodes two links away is therefore k:k0, where k0
indicates average degree under P 0. After d such steps one covers
dX
l=1
k

k
0l nodes, giving an
approximate average diameter d solution to
dX
l=0
k

k
0l
= n (12)
The heuristic argument outlined above provides a useful benchmark in many cases, how-
ever ignoring the actual structure of the network may prompt largely misleading conclusions
as shown by the work of Bollobas and Riordan (2004). Indeed, the authors are able to show
that, in the preferential attachment model (PA), whereas heuristics correctly predict a di-
ameter O( lnnln(lnn) ) when the number of links formed by entering nodes is greater than or equal
to 2, predictions fail to be revised to the correct value of O(lnn) when a single link is formed
on entry.
Our model exhibits some important similarities to PA. Bollobas and Riordans (2004)
contribution therefore rings a rst alarm concerning the use of standard methods to estimate
diameters in our case. However, simple inspection alone of the heuristic argument given
above provides convincing case against its use for our purpose. Indeed, the neighbourhood
expansion method underlying equation (12) implicitly assumes tree-like structure of the
network. Clearly, such an approximation cannot be supported in our model considering the
13
amount of neighbourhood overlap exhibited, even as n!1. The caveat is that in our model
many links are in fact redundant as they do not help to decrease the distance between nodes
much. A detailed analysis of distances arising in our model therefore represents considerable
challenge.
Short distances arise in PA (when the number of links formed by entering nodes is  2)
from the combined e¤ects of proportionality in degree-growth with randomness in linking.
As indicated previously, proportionality in degree-growth leads to the existence of some very
highly connected nodes. These nodes then act as hubs of information for newly entering nodes
which (randomly) create bridges between them. Fat-tails do result in our model, however
the number of distinct neighbourhoods connected by entering nodes is stochastic and has
mean mr" +mr (1  ") [1   (1    "4(1 ") )m]  m. Therefore, although the results from Bollobas
and Riordan (2004) indicated in the previous paragraph do not transpose immediately here,
it seems natural to conjecture that similar results hold in our model too provided m  2.
Finally, notice that our model structurally imposes a lower bound on the distance sep-
arating two nodes due to the fact that on any path between them each step size in S
is bounded above by ". Therefore, although the model guarantees existence of some very
highly connected nodes, these hubs together form a chain in which each member connects
only others close by in S. For some parameter values this e¤ect may be large and a¤ect
distances importantly. At this stage, we simply point to the fact that minor amendments
can be found that resolve this weakness. Introducing a few fully tolerant nodes would be
one way of bringing together the di¤erent hubs. Alternatively, as discussed below, allowing
for higher dimensional S can also reduce distances under appropriate assumptions.
5.2 Geographic vs non-geographic
In the most straightforward interpretation the space S may be identied with the familiar
physical geographic space, in which communication costs e¤ectively serve to inate or deate
distances. A fall in " for example corresponds to an increase in communication costs, disabling
agents to maintain ties with others far away.
Our model however may also serve as a useful yardstick in view of empirical research
concerning individualstendency to associate with others similar to them, a phenomenon
usually coined as homophily12. Our endeavour in this interpretation may be viewed as an
12See Cook, Smith-Lovin, and McPherson (2001) for a well documented survey on homophily. See also Currarini, Jackson,
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attempt to extract some of the information conveyed by linking patterns regarding nodes
preferences. In this case S may be used to represent the underlying social characteristic
space, with higher " representing more opensocieties.
Quite generally, it is insightful to view the model developed in the present paper as
an embodiment of the JRV framework in a geographical context. Following the notation of
Jackson and Rogers (2007), a non-geographic version of the model presented here is obtained
by taking a probability pr of link formation following randommeetings and some independent
probability pn of link formation following network-based meetings13. A few remarks may be
valuable. First, using (2) and (4) to substitute in (8) one obtains
F (d) = 1  ( rm
rm+ d
)1+r (13)
It can be checked that, in this more general form, expression (13) for the cdf of the
in-degree distribution applies to the non-geographic model too. This indicates that (13)
essentially captures the dynamics of the JRV framework and is quite independent of the
(non-)geographic aspect of the model.
Second, the implications of a geographic model are strongest regarding clustering. Loosely
speaking, in the geographic model clustering is determined by the dimensionality of the
underlying space14. The non-geographic model o¤ers more exibility. An interesting point
of comparison consists in setting the network-based linking probability equal to the highest
(conditional) value attained in the geographic model, i.e. to set pn = maxf 34 ; "4(1 ")g = 34 . On
the one hand it is quite compelling to choose pr so as to set the average density of linksm equal
in both models15. There are two important drawbacks however to choosing pr in this way.
One, we indicated in Section 3.2 that clustering tends to naturally drop as network density
rises due to the fact that network-based meetings occur in the rst (random) stage only. And
two, we wish to focus on rst order clustering, which further requires binding m. For these
reasons we contend that a more meaningful evaluation results from taking limits in which,
respectively, "! 0 and pr ! 0. Proposition 4 highlights the sense in which geographic settings
tend to generate networks which are more clustered than their non-geographic counterpart.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. For given numbers of links of each
and Pin (2007) for a recent theoretical investigation of the phenomenon.
13The non-geographic version of our model di¤ers slightly from Jackson and Rogers (2007) since we do not restrict new
entrants in the number of network-based meetings they make.
14See Section 5.3.1.
15Notice that this would imply choosing pr < ".
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kind, network-based links tend to be concentrated in the neighbourhood of matching parent
nodes in the geographic model whereas the same links are evenly spread between matching
and non-matching parent nodesneighbourhoods in the non-geographic model.
Proposition 4 Let pn = 34 . Then limpr!0 C
ng < lim"!0 Cg.
To complete, we should add that provided mr is small enough one may obtain Cng > Cg
for some range of pn above 34 . Such a result should not be too surprising since the non-
geographic model is naturally less binding than its geographic counterpart.
5.3 Extensions
5.3.1 Higher dimensions
To keep things simple, all results in the present paper have been derived for the case in
which S was identied with the Euclidian space16 of dimension one. The model naturally
extends into higher dimensions as well, subject to the following adjustments. In dimension
s > 1, 
i(xi) is chosen to be the s-dimensional cube of sidelength "17. This is a technical
requirement, and our results hold if we instead choose to work with balls of radius " (though
in that case they become approximations)18. The analysis carried out in Sections 2 and 3 is
easily generalized to give Proposition 5. In particular, and in view of the discussion given in
Section 5.2, Proposition 5.(ii) corroborates our early assertion that in the geographic model
clustering is determined by the dimensionality of the underlying space.
Proposition 5 In the general case, with dim(S) =s <1 and with 
(xi) denoting the s-dimensional
cube of sidelength " centred at xi, as t!1 and in the mean-eld approximation
(i) Ft(d) = 1  (  1 1+d )1=mr"
s
(ii) sup" C = lim"!0 C =
 
3
4
s

A few remarks are useful to uncover the results of Proposition 5. First, notice that
with 
(xi) so dened nodes are constrained to match along all s dimensions. Since the
16More precisely a close substitute to the Euclidian space of dimension one, namely the torus of unit length.
17Note that, just as in dimension one we chose to work with the torus of unit length, in dimension s > 1 we take S to be the
(s+ 1)-dimensional sphere normalized with unit surface.
18 In a nutshell, this condition allows us to generalize the point made by Proposition 1.(ii) whereby we showed that the extent
of interval overlap was independent of " (assuming " << 1).
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probability of matching along any one dimension is " and we have assumed independence
across dimensions, the overall matching probability is given by "s. As the dimensionality
increases, this naturally generates networks which tend to exhibit fewer links. Second, in
higher dimensions nodes typically nd themselves close to a subset of neighbours along
one dimension while they are close to other neighbours along a di¤erent dimension. The
possibilities for any given nodes neighbours to nd themselves at odds therefore increase with
the dimensionality. Figure (C) illustrates this e¤ect. Whereas in the unidimensional case
xi ' xj implies j
i \ 
j j ' j
ij, in two dimensions we draw an example for which j
i \ 
j j ' j
ij2 .
To complete, let us note that alternative versions of Proposition 5 may just as easily be
obtained for which 
(xi) is chosen di¤erently. An interesting example can be given in two
dimensions, where one only requires nodes to match along a single dimension. In that case
short (geodesic) distances between widely dissimilar nodes nodes are rendered possible by
the intervention of intermediate nodes matching both of them (along di¤erent dimensions).
5.3.2 Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity of agents naturally arises in the model as a consequence of timing. However,
we maintained throughout the existence of a single " for society as a whole. Although
this is certainly a simplifying assumption, my view is that it is easily supported as a rst
approximation by the fact that technological constraints in communication are commonly
shared, and that di¤erent societies do exhibit tendencies towards lesser or greater tolerance
levels. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for which one may want to relax this assumption.
First, in the context of communication costs we should expect heterogeneity in agentsbudget
constraints to be reected in varying " values. Second, in social dimensions contexts some
agents do tend to be more tolerant than others and this may in turn have consequences for
society as a whole. For example, highly tolerant agents can create bridges between parts of
the network segregated by social characteristics. Studying the impact of having heterogeneity
in " may therefore be an interesting path for research.
6 Concluding Remarks
The present paper suggests a possible framework to analyze the impact of changes to the
economic and social environment on the topology of networks formed. Economic (costs) and
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social (norms) constraints bind individuals in their ability to create ties with others. When
global phenomena a¤ect these constraints, the overall shapes of resulting networks naturally
alter. I have tried to shed light on this relationship.
One weakness of the analysis in the present paper relates to the fact that the optimizing
behaviour of nodes has by and large been ignored. Clearly, an interesting path for future
research would be to investigate the consequences of giving nodes some freedom regarding
their linking strategies. This is also a necessary step to truly understand the incentives
mechanisms underlying the formation of social networks.
It is hoped nally that the results of the present paper will prove useful to those doing
empirical research on networks.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Obvious.
(ii) To begin, x Xi = xi and Xj = xj, with xj 2 
(xi). Assume moreover that Xk 2 
(xj).
Under such conditions, the probability that Xk lies within 
(xi) is given by
j
(xi) \ 
(xj)j
j
(xj)j
where j:j denotes the length of an interval. This is given equivalently by
"  jxj   xij
"
By varying xj along 
(xi) and integrating out, we obtain
Pr(Xk 2 
(xi) j (Xj 2 
(xi)) ^ (Xk 2 
(Xj))) =
Z
"  jxj   xij
"
dF
where F denotes the distribution of jXj   xij conditional on Xj 2 
(xi). Under the hypothesis
of the model F is the distribution of a uniform random variable with support on

0; "2

.
Substituting in the above expression yields
Pr(Xk 2 
(xi) j (Xj 2 
(xi)) ^ (Xk 2 
(Xj))) = 2
"
Z "
2
0
"  u
"
du =
3
4
Since this result holds for arbitrary xi, the proof is concluded.
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(iii) Notice that the probability of matching with a node picked at random is the same as
that of matching with any neighbour of a node picked at random. Therefore
Pr(Xk 2 
ijXk 2 
j) = "
Conditioning on Xj and using (ii) we then get
" = Pr(Xk 2 
ijXk 2 
j)
= Pr(Xk 2 
i j (Xj 2 
i) ^ (Xk 2 
j)) Pr(Xj 2 
i) + Pr(Xk 2 
i j (Xj 2 
ci ) ^ (Xk 2 
j)) Pr(Xj 2 
ci )
=
3
4
"+ (1  ") Pr(Xk 2 
i j (Xj 2 
ci ) ^ (Xk 2 
j))
from which
Pr(Xk 2 
i j (Xj 2 
ci ) ^ (Xk 2 
j)) =
"
4 (1  ")
as indicated in the statement of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 219
Let mt denote the number of (outgoing) links formed by node t. Adding contributions
from the random and network-based processes gives
E[mt] = mr"(1 +
3
4
E[msjs < t]) +mr (1  ") ( "
4 (1  ")E[msjs < t])
= mr"(1 + E[msjs < t])
It is easy to see, by induction, that E[msjs < t]  E[mt], and so
E[mt]  mr"(1 + E[mt])
Successive substitution of the previous expression into itself then shows that for mr" < 1,
E[mt]  mr"1 mr" . E[ms] is therefore increasing and bounded, and so converges as s ! 1, as
claimed in the statement of the proposition.
Proof of Theorem 1
The equation of motion for node i is given by
ddi(t)
dt
=
mr"
t
+ (
mr"
t
)di(t) , t  i
19 I am grateful to Marco Van der Leij for suggesting this simpler version of the proof.
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with initial condition di(i) = 0. The solution to this standard ODE yields
di(t) = 
 1

t
i
mr"
   1 , t  i
Let i(d; t) denote the (unique) node with degree d at time t. Substituting in the previous
expression this is given by
i(d; t) = t

 1
 1 + d
 1
mr"
In our deterministic framework, 1   Ft(d) corresponds to the fraction of nodes older than
i(d; t), i.e.
1  Ft(d) = i(d; t)
t
=

 1
 1 + d
 1
mr"
as indicated in the Theorem.
Proof of Corollary 1
(i) It is easy to see that 1 

 1
 1+d
 1
mr" is decreasing mr and ".
Showing that 1  

 1
 1+d
 1
mr" is decreasing in , is the same as showing that

x
x+d
x
decreases in x for x > 0. Since ddx (

x
x+d
x
) =

x
x+d
x
[ln( xx+d ) +
d
x+d ], it is enough to show that
h(x) = ln( xx+d ) +
d
x+d < 0, 8x > 0. This in turn follows from the observation that d
2h(x)
dx2 =
  (3x+d)d2(x+d)3x2 < 0, 8x > 0, while
lim
x!0
h(x) =  1
and
lim
x!1h(x) = limx!1[ 
d2
x(x+ d)
] = 0 
(ii) Substitute  1 = mr, and 1mr" = 1 + r. It is then easily veried that 1  

mr
mr+d
1+r
is
decreasing in m.
(iii) Substituting as in (ii), the result follows by Theorem 6 in Jackson and Rogers (2007).
Proof of Theorem 2
Let i(g) =
X
j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgik denote the number of pairs of outgoing links (bold links in Figure
(B)) existing for node i in network g,  i(g) =
X
j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgjk denote the number of transitive pairs
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of outgoing links (bold links in Figure (A)) for node i in network g, and i(g) =
X
j 6=i;k 6=j
gijgjkgik
denote the number of triplets realized for node i in network g.
With this notation, (9) and (10) can be rewritten as
C(g) =
X
i
i(g)X
i
 i(g)
and
(g) = C(g)
X
i
 i(g)X
i
i(g)
Note that, with respect to i, each of i(g);  i(g); and i(g) involve outgoing links only. Since
all nodes are treated symmetrically in the formation process regarding outgoing links, we can
divide both nominator and denominator by t and approximate in the law of large numbers
as t!1 to get
C =
E[]
E[ ]
=
E[]
m2
and
 = C
m2
m(m  1)=2
The next step in the proof consists in calculating E[], the expected number of triplets
realized per node in the process. We consider in turn the contributions from the 3 cases
highlighted in the text (see Figure(B))
1. Both j and k were met randomly. In this case, with t large, the probability of jk existing
becomes arbitrarily small.
2. j was met randomly while k was met through the network. If k was met through
l 6= j then given the information set, the probability of jk is at most that of a highly
connected node with some other random node. This is higher than in the previous
case but still tending towards zero under weak conditions. However, when k was met
through j then we have found such a triplet by denition. Each random link engenders
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an average 3=4m matches in its neighbourhood. Therefore, the expected contribution
of this scenario is mr"(3=4:m).
3. Both j and k where met through the network. Once again, we need only consider the
situation in which j and k belong to the same parents neighbourhood. In the model,
network-based links are primarily concentrated in the neighbourhoods of matching par-
ent nodes. Each of these provides an expected 3=4m network-based links whereas
non-matching parent nodes only contributes "4(1 ")m. Three ranges of parameters must
be considered. (i) When 3=4:m < 1 second order clustering is altogether absent. (ii)
When 3=4:m > 1 > "4(1 ")m second order clustering obtains for matching parent nodes.
The situation in Figure (B) takes place an average 3=4:m(3=4:m 1)2 times per parent
node. In each of these events link jk exists with probability  (see (10)). The total
expected contribution to node is triplets is therefore mr"

3=4:m(3=4:m 1)
2

.(iii) Finally
when "4(1 ")m > 1 we must add to the previous case the contribution from second order
clustering arising in non-matching parent nodesneighbourhoods. The total expected
contribution to node is triplets becomes 

mr"
3=4:m(3=4:m 1)
2 +mr(1  ")
"m
4(1 ") (
"m
4(1 ") 1)
2

:
For "4(1 ")m > 1, adding the contributions of cases 2 and 3 above, we nd
C =
mr"(3=4:m) + 

mr"
3=4:m(3=4:m 1)
2 +mr(1  ")
"m
4(1 ") (
"m
4(1 ") 1)
2

m2
and, replacing  = C m
2
m(m 1)=2
C =
3mr"
4m
+ C
mr" [3=4:m(3=4:m  1)] +mr(1  ")
h
"m
4(1 ")

"m
4(1 ")   1
i
m(m  1)
simple algebra then yields
C =
12r (m  1)
16 (1 + r) (m  1)  m

9 + "1 "   16r

Other cases are solved in the same way. For "4(1 ")m < 1 and
3
4m > 1 we obtain
C =
12r (m  1)
16 (1 + r) (m  1)  m (9  12r)
while for 34m < 1 we have
C =
3
4m(1 + r)
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Part (i), (ii), and (iii) of Theorem 2 are easily veried by substituting out for m and r
using (2) and (4) to express C in terms of the parameters of the model.
Proof of proposition 4
In the non-geographic model, we have m = prmr +mrmpn, and m = prmr1 mrpn . In particular
m!pr!0 0, and the average number of network-based links formed also tends to zero as pr ! 0
(recall from Section 3.2 that no clustering ever arises in the neighbourhoods of these nodes
according to the model). In the limit, we can therefore safely ignore second-order clustering.
Using denitions from Section 3.2 it then follows that limpr!0 Cng =
mrprpn
m = pn(1 mrpn) <
3
4 = lim"!0 C
g, from Theorem 2.
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